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READERS’ COPYRIGHT
by JESSICA LITMAN*
I.
Consider this principle:
The purpose of copyright is to encourage reading.
Read that again.  Your response, I think, is likely to sit somewhere on the
spectrum between skepticism and scorn.  Why is that?  Is it that you view
copyright as a collection of goodies secured for their clients by overzealous
lobbyists?1  Would you be more receptive to this variation:
The purpose of copyright should be to encourage reading.
Still no, right?  What you know about copyright persuades you that the
purpose of copyright should be to give creative people incentives to do
creative work. For some of you, that means that the purpose of copyright
should be to confer strong, enforceable, assignable rights on creators and
the entities that make investments in their work.2  For others, that means
that the purpose should be to encourage creators by giving them rights
that are strong enough to enable them to make a living creating works of
authorship, but not so strong that they make it difficult for future creators
to make their own living doing the same.3  Does that capture it?
Why?  Why should copyright seek to serve the purpose of conferring
strong, enforceable, assignable rights on creators and the entities that
make investments in their work?   Alternatively, why should it seek to
offer rights to creators that are just strong enough to enable them to quit
their day jobs if they choose to?  If we attain either of those goals, what do
*John F. Nickoll Professor of Law & Professor of Information, University of Mich-
igan. Jon Weinberg read this essay and, as usual, provided astute suggestions.  I
also want to thank Rebecca Tushnet, Jane Ginsburg, and the participants in the
Fordham Law Intellectual Property and Innovation Colloquium for their useful
questions and comments.
1 See, e.g., Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Hollywood Property Values, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 20, 2011, at 17.
2 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright,
30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209 (1983).
3 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the
Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 506 (1945); William Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1700-05
(1988).
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we achieve?  If such a system encourages them to create many new works,
and store them all in a safe place, will it have accomplished what we want
it to?
I ask the question because I’m interested in exploring the reasons that
underlie the resistance of copyright lawyers and scholars to the idea that
the copyright system does or should promote reading, listening, watching
and enjoying works of authorship, except, perhaps, as a by-product of its
more important work.
The suggestion is hardly a new one.  Copyright scholar Lyman Ray
Patterson spent much of his scholarly life explaining that copyright was
most properly understood as a “law of users’ rights.”4  In 1995, UNESCO
adopted April 23 as the annual “World Book and Copyright Day,” dedi-
cated to promoting reading.5 Indeed, until the late twentieth century, cop-
yright discourse commonly identified the public’s interest in access to
works of authorship as a key copyright goal, perhaps the most important
of them.6  Judicial opinions insisted that:
The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion. . . . ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors.’ It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative
genius.7
4 See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPY-
RIGHT: A LAW OF USERS RIGHTS (1991); L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
E. BIRCH, A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT, printed in 46 HOUSTON L.
REV. 215 (2009); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Carrie Russell, Users’ Right in Copyright: An In-
terview with Ray Patterson (Dec. 1999), http://www.pla.org/ala/issuesadvo-
cacy/copyright/copyrightarticle/usersrightscopyright.cfm; sources cited infra
notes 18, 37. R
5 See United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, World
Book and Copyright Day – Apr. 23, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.
php-URL_ID=5125&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-465.
html.
6 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 5-6 (1961).
7 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting Fox
Film v. Doral, 286 U.S. 123, 127). See, e.g.,  Sony v. Universal Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Cass Country
Music v. C.H.L.R., 88 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 1996); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d,
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992); Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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Scholarly commentary emphasized the primacy of the public interest.8
Congress, for its part, once took some care to paint its copyright laws as
designed to benefit the public rather than the authors and publishers who
would enjoy the profits flowing from the temporary copyright monopoly.9
Scholarship on copyright has continued to emphasize the importance
of readers’ interests.10  Congress, not so much.  Recent congressional justi-
fications for new legislation have focused more on the advantages of the
new law for copyright owners than on the advantages for anyone else.11
8 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 325-27 (1970); Harry N. Rosenfeld, The Constitutional Dimension of
Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. 790 (1975). But see Gary
Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society’s Primacy in
Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM-VLA J. L. & ARTS 381, 383
(1985) (“While access is a valid interest of society, it is not the “purpose” of
copyright law to protect this interest.”).
9 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 6-7 (1909) (“The Constitution does not
establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to
grant such rights if it thinks best.  Not primarily for the benefit of the au-
thor, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given.”).
Compare H. R. REP. NO. 89-3327, at 32 (1966) (“The dual purposes of copy-
right protection, to stimulate authors to create and to reward them for their
efforts, are of fundamental importance, and these purposes are ill-served by
the 1909 statute.”).
10 See, e.g., Laura N. Gasaway, The New Access Right and its Impact on Libraries,
10 J. INTELL. PROP. L 269, 272 (2003); Laura Heymann, Everything is Trans-
formative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 445
(2008); Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 5 OR. L. REV. 299, 300-
01 (1996);  Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Fac-
tor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 677 (1995);  Joseph Liu, Ena-
bling Copyright’s Consumers, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1099 (2007); Joseph
Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of  the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003);
Glynn Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited,  82 B.U. L.
REV. 975 (2002); Malla Pollack, A Listeners’ Free Speech, a Reader’s Copy-
right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV 1457 (2007); Pam Samuelson, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. 319,
326 (2003); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels and Personhood: User Rights
and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1 (2011). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information
SuperHighway”: Authors, Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1995) (“[u]ser rights, albeit important, should
remain secondary.  Without authors, there are no works to use . . . .”).
11 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (“Extending copyright protection
will be an incentive for U.S. authors to continue using their creativity to
produce works, and provide copyright owners generally with the incentive
to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public. Authors
will be able to pass along to their children and grandchildren the financial
benefits of their works.”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998) (“The
digital environment now allows users of electronic media to ‘send ‘and re-
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Courts still recite the mantra that the rewards promised by copyright are
secondary to the public’s interest in access to authors’ creations.12  In El-
dred v. Ashcroft, however, the Supreme Court questioned the mantra’s
continuing persuasiveness.  The statement that copyright makes reward to
the author a secondary consideration, the majority wrote, “understates the
relationship between such rewards and the ‘Progress of Science’”:13
As we have explained, “the economic philosophy behind the [Copyright]
Clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the tal-
ents of authors and inventors.” . . .  Accordingly, “copyright law celebrates
the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the ex-
ploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in
the proliferation of knowledge . . . .  The profit motive is the engine that
ensures the progress of science.” . . .  Rewarding authors for their creative
labor and “promoting . . . Progress” are thus complementary; as James
Madison observed, in copyright “the public good fully coincides . . . with
the claims of individuals.”14
trieve perfect reproductions of copyrighted material easily and nearly in-
stantaneously, to or from locations around the world.  With this evolution in
technology, the law must adapt in order to make digital networks safe
places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted works.”); S. REP. NO. 105-
190, at 8-9 (1998) (attributing unanimous committee roll call vote in favor of
the bill to the broad support from motion picture, software, publishing, tele-
communications and information industries as well as that of writers, direc-
tors and actors); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47-50 (1976). But see H.R. REP.
NO. 108-670, at 4 (2004) (“Under existing law, moral (reputational) rights
do not supersede parental rights to raise children as they see fit.  The Com-
mittee believes that directors should be assured that their works are prop-
erly identified as such; but these same directors may not control every detail
of how their works are displayed, particularly for a legal copy aired in the
privacy of a consumer’s home.”); H.R.  REP.  105-NO. 551 pt. 2, at 27 (1998)
(“H.R. 2281, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, contains nu-
merous protections to protect the rights of copyright owners to ensure that
they feel secure in releasing their works in a digital, on-line environment.
The Committee on Commerce, however, believes that in reaching to protect
the rights of copyright owners, Congress need not encroach upon the pri-
vacy interests of consumers.”).
12 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
United States v. Paramount) (“Though the statute allows a copyright holder
to recover damages suffered at the hands of an infringer, . . . the reward to
be gained (or the loss suffered) is a “secondary consideration” in the copy-
right scheme; its “’primary object . . . lies in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.’”); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 393
(4th Cir. 2003).
13 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2004).
14 Id.  The Court continued:
Justice Breyer’s assertion that “copyright statutes must serve public,
not private, ends” post, at 6, similarly misses the mark.  The two ends are
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\58-2\CPY208.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-JUN-11 10:08
Readers’ Copyright 329
Thus, the longstanding trope that copyright subordinates the private in-
centive to the interests of the public has morphed into an assertion that
copyright achieves the public interest by appealing to the aspirations of
prospective copyright owners.
If the transition were thoughtless, or inadvertent, it would be rhetori-
cally straightforward to argue that we made a mistake when we moved
from understanding our copyright system as   designed to benefit the read-
ing public to an assumption that enhancing the wealth and power of copy-
right owners will automatically inure to the benefit of readers. Some
commentators are making more-or-less that argument,15 but without gain-
ing any apparent purchase.  Instead, it seems, copyright watchers afflicted
by the current mood doubt that copyright ever took readers’ rights seri-
ously.  Scholars’ arguments about the importance of readers’ rights seem
to have lost their conviction.  Readers’ and listeners’ rights get recast as
the rights of potential authors,16 inviting the inference that reading and
listening don’t merit a lot of protection for their own sake.   One needn’t
look far to find cynical arguments that the language of public interest was
just something that proponents of copyright said to justify their self-deal-
ing legislative proposals.17
I’m fundamentally cynical by disposition, but I want to suggest that a
clear-eyed examination of copyright’s history reveals that solicitude for
readers is, in fact, deeply encoded in copyright’s DNA.  That should be
unsurprising.  A system of copyright protection makes little sense unless it
is designed to encourage the use and enjoyment of the works it induces
not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing in-
dividuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.
Id.
15 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV.
485, 527-36 (2004); Edward C. Waltersheid, Musings on the Copyright
Power: A Critique of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 309
(2004).
16 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USE TECH-
NOLOGY AND LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
8-11 (2004); Steve Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect
User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 WID-
ENER L.J. 843 (2010); Alina Ng, When Users Are Authors: Authorship in the
Age of Digital Media, 12 VAN. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 853 (2010); John
Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural Law Copyright, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465 (2005).
17 See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:
Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 365, 438-39, 447-53 (2004); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legis-
lative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139
(1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1197 (1996).
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authors to create and publishers to disseminate.  Somewhat more contro-
versially, I want to suggest that the current copyright system incorporates
a variety of reader-centric provisions that many of us have learned not to
see.  If we categorize copyright’s concern for readers, listeners and viewers
as extraneous or incidental, we can miss its crucial importance in the over-
all copyright scheme.
I suspect that much of the resistance to the explicit recognition of
readers’ rights in copyright is based on fear about what rights and privi-
leges readers might demand if we acknowledged their claim to ask for any.
Recognition of the legitimacy of readers’ interests might be the entry of
the camel’s nose into the tent.  Some scholars have suggested that the im-
portance of readers’ copyright interests not only counsels a copyright law
of a different shape from our current one, but may constitutionally compel
it.18  This has inspired some proponents of strong copyright protection to
overreactions.19  At least one writer has complained that those who argue
that readers have copyright rights are members of a conspiracy of pirates
and pirate-sympathizers.20  Another insists that defenders of “fair use
rights” are “enemies of copyright.”21
18 See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right”of Authors, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1993); Richard Stallman, Misinterpreting Copyright: A
Series of Errors, in RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCI-
ETY:  SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 111 (2010).
19 See, e.g., David Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under
U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 345, 373-74 (2005) (criticizing
Patterson’s views).
20 See MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 33 (2009):
[T]here actually is a kind of tribe, a community of interests, united by a
shared passion in attacking copyright.  They are in spirit the impossible
fusion of the tribe of boys in The Lord of the Flies, the extras in a Mel
Gibson post-nuclear-holocaust movie, and the American Library Associ-
ation. Their wildness has been denatured into a crusade against copyright,
their audacity lies in button-pushing, and their chief barbarism is the use
of intemperate language behind a shield of anonymity on the internet.
They are sprinkled like confectioners sugar over all the United States,
although no doubt more than 99 percent of them reside within an iPod’s
throw of a Starbucks . . . .
Make no mistake about this.  They may protest that they are not
against copyright itself but rather its abuses, extensions, and unnecessary
inconveniences.  This is an unartful dodge.  Not only the persistent un-
dercurrents of the logic and commentary, but their unselfconciously ex-
pressed arguments show their true colors.
See also id. at 35-6 (“The anti-copyright bull . . . is quick, massive, muscular,
untiring, and stupid.  Although it can’t (or doesn’t) really read, write, or
think, it and others like it are setting the agenda for your future and mine.”)
21 See Fred I Koenigsberg, Humpty Dumpty in Copyrightland, 51 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 677, 680-81 (2004). See also id. at 679:
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My goal in this project is to reclaim copyright for readers (and listen-
ers, viewers, and other members of the audience).22  I think, and will try to
persuade you, that the gradual and relatively recent disappearance of
readers’ interests from the core of copyright’s perceived goals has unbal-
anced the copyright system.  It may have prompted, at least in part, the
scholarly critique of copyright that has fueled copyright lawyers’ impres-
sion that “so many in academia side with the pirates.”23  It may also be
responsible for much of the deterioration in public support for copyright.
I argue here that copyright seems out of whack because it has forgotten
some of its most important constituents.
My method in this essay will be incremental.  I propose to take a se-
ries of very small baby steps in the direction of recognizing rights within
the copyright system for readers, listeners, viewers and other members of
the copyright audience.   In part II of this essay, I argue that copyright law
There is a battle raging between those who support creativity — led by
creative talents such as songwriters, composers, lyricists, authors, and the
business entities underwriting them, such as music publishers and motion
picture companies — and those who do not — such as those in the so-
called Internet “community” who claim “information wants to be free.”
22 The audience for copyrighted work has expanded over the past 300 years along
with copyright’s subject matter.  There is an understandable temptation, at
least among lawyers, to see the audiences for newfangled works as “con-
sumptive users,” to use Jane Ginsburg’s phrase, and therefore less worthy
members of the copyright audience than the readers of books. See Jane C.
Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPRYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 15
(1997).  For that reason, some readers of this essay may accuse me of cheat-
ing by focusing on readers’ rights rather than something I could name
“users’ rights” or “consumers’ rights.”   The tendency to see music listeners,
art viewers, television watchers, or video-game players as less deserving of
copyright’s solicitude than book readers, though, strikes me as misguided.
We’ve made the choice to give authors of music, art, television and video
parity with writers of books in the rights conferred by the copyright system.
If we believe that these works merit copyright protection, it should follow
that we value opportunities to experience and enjoy those works enough to
assure the reasonable freedom to take advantage of them. See Jessica Lit-
man, Creative Reading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 179-80 (2007).  My
quarrel with category names like “users” or “consumers” is that they ob-
scure the important, creative, and imaginative behavior by which reading,
listening, watching, and playing further copyright’s goals.
23 Preston Padden, email to cyberprof mailing list (Jan. 30, 2011, 6:03 p.m.), avail-
able at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/private/cyberprof/2011-Janu-
ary/004053.html.  The cyberprof mailing list is an email forum for Internet
law teachers.  Mr. Padden is a Senior Fellow and board member of the Uni-
versity of Colorado Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, Technology and En-
trepreneurship, and a former Walt Disney Company executive.  He
graciously consented to my quotation and citation of his email messages to
the list.
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has historically viewed readers’ interests as crucially important.  In part
III, I claim that a copyright system makes little policy sense unless it seeks
to encourage reading and listening.  In part IV, I explore the current copy-
right law searching for protection of readers’ interests, and find significant
ones.  In part V, I review some of the arguments that have been or could
be made against explicit recognition of readers’ rights, and find them un-
persuasive.  In part VI, I explore very tentatively the freedoms that copy-
right should secure to readers, listeners and viewers.  I conclude that the
current fashion for discounting readers’ rights both undermines copy-
right’s usefulness and threatens its legitimacy.
II.
Gutenberg invented his printing press in the 1430s.  As the press
spread across Europe, individuals asked for and received exclusive print-
ing privileges.24  In England, the printers’ guild’s desire to suppress com-
petition and the Tudor monarchs’ desires to suppress sedition combined to
engender a censorship regime that became known as “Stationers’ Copy-
right.”  Only members of the Stationers’ Guild were permitted to print
books.  The Guild instituted a licensing regime that both facilitated the
censorship of printed matter and protected guild members from competi-
tion by other members.25  By the end of the seventeenth century, though,
both censorship and monopolies had fallen out of favor, and Parliament
allowed the licensing acts that gave the Stationers their exclusive rights to
lapse.26  The Stationers lobbied heavily for the reinstitution of their exclu-
sive printing privileges, without success.27  In 1710, Parliament enacted the
Statute of Anne, a law commonly agreed to be the world’s first copyright
bill, as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the
24 See generally CIPIL, Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900), http://www.
copyrighthistory.org; Craig W. Dallon, supra note 17, at 381-91; Joanna R
Kostylo, From Gunpowder to Print: The Common Origins of Copyright and
Patent, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY:  ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPY-
RIGHT 21 (Ronan Deazley, Martin Keetschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010)
[hereinafter PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY]; Edward S. Rogers, Some Histori-
cal Matter Concerning Literary Property, 7 MICH. L. REV. 101 (1908).
25 See Stationers’ Charter London (1557) (Ronan Deazley ed., 2008), in Primary
Sources on Copyright (1450–1900), supra note 24; 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:6-§ 1:8, at 1-47–1-87 (2009); Dallon, supra note
17, at 391- 99; Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, R
supra note 18, at 9-12.
26 See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 1-6 (2004);
Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagit-
ica, the Stationers’ Company, and the Statute of Anne, in PRIVILEGE AND
PROPERTY, supra note 24, at 67, 77-82.
27 See DEAZLEY, supra note 26, at 6-29.
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Times therein mentioned.”  Although the Statute of Anne incorporated
features drawn from the Stationers’ proposals, it also diverged from Sta-
tioners’ Copyright in important respects.28  The Statute granted exclusive
rights to print and reprint books.  It vested those rights, at least nominally,
in authors rather than Stationers.  It limited the term of the rights to
twenty-one years for previously printed books, and a renewable fourteen
year term for books not yet printed.29
When copyright lawyers talk about the Statute of Anne, they tend to
focus on these two innovations:  the grant of rights to authors rather than
to publishers,30 and the limited copyright term.31  It’s worthwhile, though,
to recall that the rights granted by the statute were also limited in scope —
to printing — and in subject matter — to published books.  Other uses of
books were beyond the copyright owner’s control.  It was fine for anyone
to read the books aloud, in public; it was okay to resell used copies; there
was nothing illegal about dramatizing the books and performing the result-
ing play on the stage for paying audiences; one needed no permission to
abridge the books and publish the abridgment, or to write and sell copies
of a sequel or translation.   Lectures, unpublished plays, operas, music,
paintings, sculptures, and other non-books were unprotected.
In addition to granting authors printing rights in their books, moreo-
ver, the Statute of Anne imposed obligations.  Claimants needed to regis-
ter their rights (so that everyone could find out who owned the exclusive
printing right and when it would expire).32  The copyright owner was re-
28 See id. at 31-50.
29 Statute of Anne, 8. Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Eng.), Primary Sources on Copyright
(1450–1900), supra note 24. See DEAZLEY, supra note 26, at 41-50.
30 See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:  THE INVENTION OF COPY-
RIGHT 47-48  (1993); Lionel Bentley & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right
. . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights
From The Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1475, 1479 (2010).
31 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 30, at 44-46; Jane C. Ginsburg, Un Chose Publique?
The Author’s Domain and the Public Domain in Early British, French, and
US Copyright Law, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636 (2006).
32 Statute of Anne (“And whereas many persons may through ignorance offend
against this Act, unless some provision be made, whereby the property in
every such book, as is intended by this Act to be secured to the proprietor
or proprietors thereof, may be ascertained, as likewise the consent of such
proprietor or proprietors for the printing or reprinting of such book or
books may from time to time be known; be it therefore further Enacted by
the authority aforesaid That nothing in this Act contained shall be con-
strued to extend to subject any Bookseller, printer, or other person whatso-
ever to the forfeitures or penalties therein mentioned, for or by reason of
the printing or reprinting of any book or books without such consent, as
aforesaid, unless the Title to the Copy of such book or books hereafter pub-
lished shall, before such publication, be entered in the Register Book of the
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quired to donate free copies of the book to the royal library and to the
libraries of the country’s major universities.33  Finally, any member of the
public who felt that the price the copyright owner charged for copies of
the book was unreasonable could petition the government to set a fair
price.34
Thus, the first copyright statute gave copyright owners narrowly
bounded rights.  It allowed readers the freedom to engage in a host of
potentially valuable uses outside of the boundaries.   Copyright owners
had the obligation to make copies of their books available to the public for
Company of Stationers in such manner as hath been usual, which Register
Book shall at all times be kept at the Hall of the said Company . . . .”).
33 See id. (“It is hereby Enacted that nine Copyes of each book or books upon
the best paper that . . . shall be printed and published as aforesaid or Re-
printed and published with additions shall by the printer and printers
thereof be delivered to the Warehouse Keeper of the said Company of Sta-
tioners for the time being at the hall of the said Company before such publi-
cation made for the use of the Royal Library the Libraryes of the
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge the Librarys of the four Universities
in Scotland the Library of Sion College in London and the Library com-
monly called the Library belonging to the Faculty of Advocates at Edin-
burgh respectively . . . .”)
34 See id:
[I]t is hereby further Enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any
Bookseller or Booksellers, printer or printers, shall, after the said Five
and twentieth day of March, One thousand Seven hundred and ten, set a
price upon, or sell, or expose to sale, any Book or Books at such a price
or rate as shall be conceived by any person or persons to be too high and
unreasonable; It shall and may be Lawful for any person or persons, to
make Complaint thereof to [list of government officials] who or any one
of them, shall and have hereby full power and authority, from time, to
time, to send for, summon, or call before him or them such Bookseller or
Booksellers, printer or printers, and to Examine and Enquire of the rea-
son of the dearness and enhancement of the price or value of such book
or books by him or them so sold or exposed to sale: And if upon such
enquiry and Examination it shall be found That the price of such book or
books is inhaunced or any wise to high or unreasonable, Then and in such
case the said [official] so enquiring and examining, have hereby full
power and authority to reform and redress the same, and to limit and
settle the price of every such printed book and books, from time to time,
according to the best of their judgments, and as to them shall seem just
and reasonable . . . .
No scholar has unearthed any report of this price control provision’s
actually being enforced, so it seems likely that it was never invoked.  That
said,  book historian William St Clair  reports that Parliament enacted book
price control statutes as early as 1534, and that price controls on books were
enforced through the sixteenth century, until Parliament repealed all  book
price control statutes in 1739. See WILLIAM ST. CLAIR, THE READING NA-
TION IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 457-58 (2004).
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purchase (by publishing them) and for reading without purchase (by do-
nating copies to libraries). Readers who wanted to buy the books but
couldn’t afford them could appeal to the government to order the copy-
right owners to lower the price. These are provisions that have no point
unless they are designed to facilitate reading.
I’m not yet making any grandiose claims; I’m not suggesting that con-
temporary American readers might be entitled to invoke rights afforded to
eighteenth-century British readers.  Rather, I want merely to observe that
the first copyright statute took some pains to ensure the protection of
readers’ interests, despite the fact that the actors urging Parliament to en-
act such a law were printers and publishers rather than readers.35  That
shouldn’t be controversial.
Scholars agree that the American framers’ understanding of the Stat-
ute of Anne and the history of Stationers’ copyright shaped their concep-
tion of Article 1, section 8, clause 8, and the first U.S. copyright statute
enacted in 1790.36  A power to “promote the Progress of Science,” histori-
ans write, was essentially synonymous with the Statute of Anne’s stated
purpose of “the Encouragement of Learning.”37  Such evidence as histori-
ans have unearthed, moreover, suggests that the framers believed that en-
couraging the creation and dissemination of literature and knowledge
would promote learning.38  Edward Waltersheid notes that at the time that
clause 8 was drafted, the book trade in the United States was modest, and
the concerns of the book business were unlikely to have had much influ-
ence.39  Thus, when the first Congress followed the Statute of Anne in
35 See William St. Clair, Metaphors of Intellectual Property in PRIVILEGE AND
PROPERTY, supra note 24, at 369, 373.
36 See, e.g., EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE:  A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  63, 106, 111-
13, 145-51, 258-59 (2002); Samuelson, supra note 10, at 325.
37 See WALTERSHEID, supra note 36, at 150-51; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copy-
right Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 938 (2003).
38 See WALTERSHEID, supra note 36, at 150-51; Malla Pollack, What Is Congress
Supposed to Promote?, Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the “Progress” Clause,  80
NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
39 See WALTERSHEID, supra note 36, at 150. See also Oren Bracha, Early Ameri-
can Printing Privileges: The Ambivalent Origins of Authors’ Copyright in
America, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY, supra note 24, at 89, 97-100 (con-
trasting the colonies’ “small and unorganised book trade” with publishers’
guilds in Europe).  The overwhelming majority of books in colonial libraries
and bookstores were foreign imports, which received no U.S. copyright pro-
tection until 1891. See St. Clair, supra note 35, at 375 (books written and
printed in American colonies were only “a tiny proportion of the texts that
were read” by colonists).
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titling the first U.S. copyright statute “An act for the Encouragement of
Learning”40  it appears to have believed that the statute would do so.
In the United States, the initial copyright law did not include either a
library donation obligation or a provision for regulating book prices.41 Nor
did it limit its coverage explicitly to published works.  Those would come
later.  The 1790 law conferred a fourteen-year exclusive right, renewable
once, to “print, reprint, publish or vend” a map, chart or book on authors
or their assigns who registered their claims with the clerk of the district
court,  and deposited a copy with the Secretary of State within six months
of publication.42  While the U.S. Statute did not (yet) incorporate the ex-
press provisions for the benefit of readers that appeared in the Statute of
Anne,  the restriction of the scope of the copyright exclusive right to print-
ing, reprinting, publishing and vending, and the short copyright duration,
kept  the exclusive rights  from  impinging on the freedom of individual
readers to enjoy copyrighted works.43
Ray Patterson relied on the history surrounding the Statute of Anne
to argue that the copyright clause, properly understood in the light of its
context, constrained Congress to enact copyright laws that promoted
learning, protected the public domain, and vested meaningful rights in in-
dividual creators.44  Patterson argued that the framers understood these
goals to have motivated the enactment of the Statute of Anne, and that
they incorporated that understanding into the copyright clause by empow-
ering Congress to secure authors’ “exclusive Right” — which the framers
understood to be a time-limited right to print, reprint and vend.45 Patter-
son may well have correctly divined the framers’ historical understand-
ing,46 but we don’t need to agree that his construction represents the
40 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
41 Id.  The law did, however, require  owners of copyrights in any  book, map or
chart to “within six months after the publishing thereof, deliver, or cause to
be delivered to the Secretary of State a copy of the same, to be preserved
. . . .” Id. § 4.
42 Id. §§ 3, 4. See Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4584).
43 See, e.g., Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888) (“the effect of a
copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book which is sold.  I
go to a book-store, and I buy a book which has been copyrighted.  I may use
that book for reference, study, reading, lending, copying passages from it at
my will.  I may not duplicate that book, and thus put it upon the market, for
in so doing I would infringe the copyright.  But merely taking extracts from
it, merely using it, in no manner infringes upon the copyright.”).
44 See Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, supra note 18,
at 16-24.
45 See id. at 16, 25-32.
46 See Edward Walterscheid, Originalism and the IP Clause: A Comment on Pro-
fessor Oliar’s “New Reading”, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 113, 114-15
(2010), available at http://uclalawreview.org/?p=1428; Edward C. Walter-
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original meaning of the copyright clause or limits Congress’s exercise of its
authority.  It’s enough for our purposes to recognize that early copyright
laws in both England and the United States incorporated provisions in-
tended to protect readers as well as authors and publishers.
The conventional story we tell about subsequent copyright revisions is
that each new copyright law expanded the subject matter of coverage,
scope of rights and duration of copyrights.47  That picture is largely accu-
rate.  At the same time, it is easy to forget that later revisions of the Amer-
ican copyright law tempered the expansion with provisions designed to
protect the interests of readers and other users.48  Thus, nineteenth cen-
tury copyright amendments limited the scope of coverage to published
works,49 adopted a requirement that copyright owners mark all copies
with copyright notice,50 and required the deposit of copies in the Library
of Congress.51  In the twentieth century, Congress codified judge-made
privileges permitting individuals to use copyrighted works in ways that
copyright owners might not authorize.52  It adopted price controls, cast as
statutory compulsory licenses.53  Moreover, despite some lobbying to ex-
tend copyright to enable copyright owners to control private and personal
uses,54 Congress has largely refused to expand copyright rights to encom-
pass them.55
Let me stop to remind you, again, of what I am not doing:  I am not
claiming that a copyright statute must include protection for readers’
rights in order to pass constitutional muster (although others have made
scheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts: The Back-
ground and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution,  2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 36-37 (1994).
47 See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54-80 (2008); 1
PATRY, supra note 27, §§ 1:20–1:115.
48 See, e.g., ALAN LATMAN, HOWELL’S COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (rev. ed. 1962).
49 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 90, 14 Stat. 395. See Boucicault v. Hart, 3 F. Cas.
983, 984-85 (1875) (No. 1692); Koppel v. Downing, 11 App. D.C. 93 (1897).
50 Act of April 29, 1802, 2 Stat. 171. See Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903);
Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123 (1889).
51 Act of Aug. 10, 1846, 9 Stat. 106; see Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557 (1881).
52 See Copyright Act of March 4, 1909 [“1909 Act”], Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1975
§§ 28, 31, 41; 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law [“1976 Act”], Pub.
L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 §§ 107, 109, 110, 117, 1008.
53 See 1909 Act § 1(e); 1976 Act §§ 114, 115, 118, 119.
54 See Copyright Law Revision, pt. 3: Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copy-
right Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft 137 (remarks of
Barbara Ringer, Copyright Office) (1964); id. at 140 (Edward A. Sargoy,
American Bar Ass’n); id. at 155 (Douglas Anello, National Ass’n of
Broadcasters).
55 See generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1904-
20 (2007).
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that argument,56 and it may indeed be true).  Rather, I am for the moment
seeking to make a more modest point:  copyright law has always incorpo-
rated some solicitude for readers’ interests, and it would be nonsense to
argue that the concept of readers’ rights is somehow alien to copyright.57
That’s all we need for my next step, which is to persuade you that it would
be a stupid policy choice to enact a copyright statute that pays no attention
to readers’ interests.
III.
Why do we have copyright laws?  Two explanations are common:
under the first, we enact copyright laws to encourage creative people to
engage in and disseminate creative work.58  Under the second, we reward
creative people for their creative works by giving them copyright protec-
tion.59 Both accounts rest on assumptions about authors’ motivations that
have been questioned in recent scholarship.60 For now, though, let’s pre-
tend that those assumptions are rooted in something real.  How is it that
either the incentive mechanism or the reward mechanism “promote[s] the
Progress of Science”?  Both mechanisms are said to encourage the crea-
tion and distribution of more or better works of authorship.61 We don’t
always pay explicit attention to what happens to the works once they are
56 See, e.g., Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, supra note
18; Rosenfeld, supra note 8; Hon. Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A
Constitutional Imperative: The 36th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 139 (2007).
57 But see Johnstone, supra note 19, at 401 (“Copyright law was never meant to
be about the user as a rights holder.”).
58 See, e.g., Tom Bell, Authors Welfare:  Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 237 (2003); Lydia Pallas
Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 6-8
(2008).
59 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 58, at 239-40; Robert P. Merges, Locke Remixed ;-),
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259 (2007); WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT
BOOK:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE, at xi (3d ed. 1990) (“Copyright . . . springs
from the belief that those who try to contribute to our always inadequate
store of information and inspiration ought to be paid for their pains.”).
60 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy:
A Research Agenda, 2011 WISC. L. REV __ (forthcoming 2011); Eben
Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:  Free Software and the Death of Copy-
right, 4 first monday #8 (Aug. 1999), available at http://firstmonday.org/
htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/684/594; Rebecca Tushnet,
Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM &
MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Diane Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives:
Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 29 (2011).
61 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 22-28 (1994).
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made available to the public.62  It’s difficult to find a wealth of authority
for the proposition that the ultimate goal of encouraging the creation and
dissemination of all those works is that members of the public will read,
hear, see and (sometimes) learn from the works, because we tend to take
that part of the copyright ecosystem for granted.63  Legal consideration of
readers’ rights abounds in discussions of censorship and education,64 but is
scarcer in copyright discourse.65  But a moment’s reflection should reveal
that a copyright system with no readers, listeners or viewers to enjoy the
copyrighted works that the system produces has no plausible mechanism
for promoting the progress of anything.  If authors create copyrighted
works and deposit them in secure bank vaults, or send them off to a gov-
ernment storage facility for surplus creativity, the authors may find the
process of creation enriching.  In that scenario, though, nobody benefits
from the existence of copyright protection.  Readers cannot read, enjoy
and learn, and creators can’t earn copyright royalties from works that no-
body has the occasion to read.  Thus, readers, listeners and viewers are
indispensable participants in a working copyright system.66  Without them,
the system is pointless.
That observation seems hardly controversial enough to be worth ar-
ticulating, were it not for the resistance that the idea seems to generate.
Supporters of strong copyright laws insist that copyright law’s goal is to
encourage the production of works; it should be up to copyright owners to
decide whether and how to encourage distribution and access.67  Pressed
62 But cf. Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (characterizing arguments for ex-
tending IP rights as “ex post” because they claim that further incentives are
required to encourage IP owners to manage or control their IP).
63 But see Recording Indus. Ass’n v. Diamond Multimedia Sys, 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the “main purpose” of the Audio Home
Recording Act as “the facilitation of personal use”).
64 See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS’N., INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL 201-
300 (8th ed. 2010); JOANN BASS ET. AL, A DECLARATION OF READERS’
RIGHTS:  RENEWING OUR COMMITMENT TO STUDENTS 58-94 (2008).
65 For particularly articulate discussions, see Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anon-
ymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 981 (1996); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies, Copyright Law
and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245 (2001);
Lunney, supra note 10; Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 4; Patterson,
Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, supra note 18; PATTERSON
& BIRCH, supra note 4; Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay, How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J.
535, 562-82 (2004).
66 I explore this argument at greater length in Jessica Litman, Real Copyright
Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2010); Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 22;
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 55.
67 See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 8, at 384.
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as to why anyone would choose to design such a system, they respond,
counterfactually, that copyright has from the beginning addressed itself to
authors’ rights and not users’ rights.68  Besides, they insist, as the holders
of “property rights,” copyright owners must be able to capture the value of
their property by controlling its use.69 That justification, though, rests on
an idealized Blackstonian image of property rights that exist nowhere in
the real world.  The law imposes many limits, exceptions, and regulations
on both real and personal property ownership, sale and licensing.70  We’re
familiar enough with them to take most of them for granted, and they’ve
become almost invisible. As many scholars have recognized, calling copy-
right “property” doesn’t tell us very much about how the law should treat
it.71
We treat copies and phonorecords of copyrighted books and music
differently from the way we treat cases of bottled water.  In both cases, the
proprietor of the object has both mixed its labor with an extant resource,
and made an investment in bringing the object to market (which may have
generated jobs and other good things).  The water purveyor has had to
comply with state and federal obligations regarding sanitation, labeling,
and permissible additives; the seller of books and music has not.  If I spend
my money on the water, I’m allowed to drink it or make soup with it.  If
the water seller were to instruct me that I may not cook with it and must
serve it chilled, I might view it as a serving suggestion or a safety warning,
but I would not conclude that I was obliged to comply with it. I may resell
the water, with or without its bottle; consume it publicly or privately; share
it with strangers or hoard it without opening it.  If I store the water in my
basement as a hedge against natural disaster, and the plastic water bottles
were to survive for more than ninety-five years, my rights to the contents
of the bottles wouldn’t change.  If, instead, I spend my money on a book, a
CD, a Blu-ray disk, a painting, or a computer program, we allow the copy-
68 See, e.g., Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 681-89; Johnstone, supra note 19, at
348, 350-58.
69 See, e.g., Joint Study on 17 U.S.C. Sections 109 and 117: Public Hearing 295,
300 (Nov. 29, 2000) (testimony of Cary Sherman, RIAA), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/transcript.pdf; Andrew
F. Spillane, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm
in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INT. PROP. L. REV. 257, 283-84 (2011).
70 See, e.g., Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and
the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2010).
71 See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 70, at 682-701; Justin Hughes, Copyright and R
Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization and Thomas Jeffer-
son, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1077-82 (2006); Neil W. Netanel and David
Nimmer, Is Copyright Property? – The Debate in Jewish Law, 12 THEORETI-
CAL INQ. L. 241, 242 (2011).
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right owner to impose restrictions on my uses of the work.  The law un-
makes those restrictions as soon as the copyright expires.  A crucial reason
for treating books differently from the way we treat bottles of water de-
rives from the good and bad consequences we anticipate once they are
distributed to consumers. If that’s an important concern, it would be silly
to design the system in a way that ignores it.
Arguments suggesting that copyright should pay attention to readers’
rights only because the readers of today might become the authors of to-
morrow miss an important point.  Reading (and listening, and watching) is
good in its own right.72  Reading can be passive absorption — cramming
for exams or watching some sitcoms are both more like that than not —
but reading can also be a highly creative, imaginative activity.73  We don’t
need post-modern literary theorists to persuade us that different readers
imagine the characters in novels as very different people.   Listening, too,
can involve a great deal of imagination.  Watching movies involves crea-
tive contribution on the viewers’ parts.74   That process, of bringing indi-
vidual imagination and creativity to works of authorship made by others is
important.  Having a society full of individuals with creativity and imagina-
tion who exercise both regularly is good for our society in a host of differ-
ent ways.
Most copyright experts would agree that encouraging that creativity
and imagination has been, and should continue to be, one of copyright
law’s core goals.  The benefits of creativity and imagination, though, need
not, should not, and have not been limited to authors.  It doesn’t matter
whether people read books and take from them something that will inspire
them to grow up and win a Nobel or Pulitzer prize.  At the same time, it
doesn’t promote the progress of science and the useful arts if the system
merely results in the creation and duplication of loads of books, CDs,
movies and computer programs that are then stored in some  landfill for
ninety-five years.  A copyright system only makes sense if it facilitates
communication of the works to audiences who experience and enjoy them.
72 Because reading is itself so important, we subsidize activities likely to en-
courage more of it.  Nor is copyright the only subsidy.  State and federal
governments spend billions of dollars annually on education.
73 See, e.g., Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 22, at 178-80.
74 If you’ve seen the film Inception and sampled just a small fraction of the de-
bate about what the final shot signifies, you’ve seen this in action.  If not,
check out the “Inception Ending” blog, which claims to aggregate theories
about the ending of the movie, http://www.inceptionending.com (last visited
Feb. 7, 2011).
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IV.
Modern copyright law seems less like a law designed to encourage
reading and more like a law crafted by rent-seeking.  We no longer require
publication; copyrights no longer expire within a reasonable period of
time; copyright’s exclusive rights are no longer so bounded.75  We still re-
quire copyright owners to deposit two copies of published works with the
Library of Congress,76 but copyright lawyers argue that the deposit re-
quirement is really unrelated to copyright — it’s simply a tax on authors to
subsidize the maintenance of a national library, and shouldn’t be part of
the copyright law at all.77  Copyright lawyers who represent authors or
publishers insist that their clients are the primary and only direct benefi-
ciaries of copyright, and that readers, listeners and other users have no
copyright rights.78  In the context of recent debates over copyright’s ex-
pansion, it’s understandable that we’ve forgotten the ways in which copy-
right law attends to readers’ interests.  But, in fact, U.S. copyright law still
has important provisions designed to protect the freedom to read, listen
and watch.  We just have come to talk about them as “exceptions” rather
than rights.79
Copyright gives no exclusive rights to control private performance or
display.80  What you do with a book, movie, or sound recording in your
living room is not copyright infringement, even if your copy is pirated.
Private performance and display is simply off limits.  (That isn’t because
copyright owners didn’t ask for private performance and display rights —
they did.  But nobody took those demands seriously, I think, because at
some level everyone understood that the freedom to read and enjoy mate-
rial without the copyright police looking over your shoulder is an interest
that copyright law has respected and should protect.81)  Moreover, copy-
right gives no right to control the resale, loan or public display of lawfully
made copies by the owner of the copies.82  (And again, it isn’t that some
75 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106, 302, 304 (2006).
76 Id. § 407.
77 See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright from Formalities, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (1995); Copyright Reform Act of 1993: Hearings on
H.R. 897 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the House Judici-
ary Comm., 103d Cong. 117, 118 (1993) (testimony of Steven Metalitz, In-
formation Industry Ass’n.).
78 See Kauffman, supra note 8; sources cited supra notes 19, 21.
79 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 2. R
80 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (5) (2006).
81 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, pt. 3, supra note 54, at 136-37, 240 (remarks
of Barbara Ringer, Copyright Office).
82 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
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copyright owners didn’t request those rights.83)  Thus the current statute
has a significant and longstanding zone of personal liberty within which
individuals may enjoy copyrighted works without copyright owners’
interference.84
In addition, the statute has a number of express privileges designed to
encourage reading, listening, viewing and enjoyment of copyrighted
works.  Some of those are carve-outs lobbied for by specific businesses;
some of them are Congress’s efforts to repudiate overreaching copyright
claims as narrowly as possible; others are broader exceptions surviving
from an earlier era when copyright laws were simpler and less encompass-
ing.   An example of a carve-out is the provisions allowing bars and restau-
rants to play copyrighted music over radio or television receivers.85  An
example of the narrow repudiation is the provision in section 117 allowing
computer repair businesses to turn on consumers’ computers if necessary
to make repairs,86 or the provision in section 110(11) allowing families to
use censorware in conjunction with viewing DVDs in their living rooms.87
An example of the surviving old-style limit is the school assembly provi-
sion in section 110(4) allowing noncommercial performances of music or
literary works.88  Those of you who eat, drink and breathe copyright law
will have noticed the regulations last summer exempting six classes of
works from the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.89  The Regis-
ter’s analysis of those exceptions revealed an investment in the notion that
people who have paid for access to a work should be entitled, under the
copyright law, to some freedom to enjoy it the way they want to, even if it
isn’t the way the copyright owner wants them to enjoy it.90
Finally, of course, there’s fair use.91 Copyright lawyers disagree vehe-
mently over the proper scope of fair use.92 Professor Glynn Lunney argues
83 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, pt. 3, supra note 54, at 110 (remarks of Abe
Goldman, Copyright Office).
84 See Liu, Owning Digital Copies, supra note 65, at 1280-309.
85 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2006).
86 Id. § 117(c).
87 Id. § 10(11).
88 Id. § 10(4).
89 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Sys-
tems for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825 (July 27, 2010),
available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-18339.pdf.
90 See Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H.
Billington, Librarian of Congress, Recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights in RM-2008-8 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/1201/2010/initialed-registers-recommendation-june-11-2010.pdf.
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
92 Compare, e.g., Johnstone supra note  19, at 350 (“there are no ‘fair use rights’
and . . . there should not be any, inasmuch as such a scheme would be
wholly inconsistent with U.S. copyright policy.”) with, e.g., PATTERSON &
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\58-2\CPY208.txt unknown Seq: 20  8-JUN-11 10:08
344 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
that fair use should be broad enough to encompass most personal copy-
ing.93  Copyright lawyer Fred Koenigsberg tells us that “there is no fair use
right”: the privilege to make a fair use must be a narrow exception, not the
rule.94 Judge Stanley Birch insists that fair use permits all personal and
educational uses.95  Professor Paul Goldstein claims that any fair use privi-
lege but a stingy one would violate our obligations under the Berne Con-
vention.96 Professor Christina Bohannon writes that fair use should excuse
all uses that cause the copyright owner no harm.97 Professor Tim Wu cau-
tions, “thanks to the inherent vagueness in the concept of fair use, and
with the costs of litigation, the contours of fair use for casual infringement
have not been — and may never be — well mapped out.”98  For our pur-
poses, we need only agree that fair use will excuse some uses beyond the
ones the statute otherwise expressly allows, including some uses by read-
ers, listeners and viewers that might be characterized as “consumptive”
rather than transformative.99
I began by claiming that copyright had taken reader’s interests seri-
ously from the very beginning of its history.  I then suggested that solici-
tude for readers made ample copyright policy sense.  I finally explored
some of the ways that current copyright law preserves a zone of copyright
liberty for readers, listeners and viewers to enjoy copyrighted works with
relatively few legal constraints.  I have not yet said anything that even the
most ardent supporter of broad copyright protection should find objec-
tionable.  I’ll begin to do that in the next section.
BIRCH, supra note 4, at 335 (“personal fair use promotes the ultimate goal
of copyright law as manifested in the learning policy of the Copyright
Clause: a society of informed citizens capable of self- government”) and
Hughes, supra note 71, at 1081 (“[S]ection 107 fair use draws a border on
the property rights granted under section 106.  Everything on the fair use
side is not just fair use, it is outside the property right”).
93 See Lunney, supra note 10, at 979, 983-85.
94 See Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 679-80. See also Preston Padden, email to
Cyberprof mailing list (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:36 p.m.), available at https://mailman.
stanford.edu/mailman/private/cyberprof/2011-January/004038.html (“Fair
Use is a very specific statutory defense to a charge of infringement.  It is not
a ‘right.’  In no legal sense does it ‘act as a right.’  It is a defense, period.”)
95 See Birch, supra note 56.
96 See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J. L.  & ARTS  433, 442
(2008).
97 See Christina Bohannon, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007).
98 See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 620 (2008).
99 An example that I’ve explored elsewhere is the act of backing up the contents
of one’s hard disk. See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 55, at
1897-903.
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V.
Contemporary commentary on the readers’ interest in copyright law
for the most part seems to view readers’ rights as rhetorical code for copy-
right reduction, supported only by copyright’s enemies.  Self-styled friends
of copyright accuse those of us who speak of readers’ rights as waging war
on creativity.100
Writers who resist the idea of readers’ rights in copyright are passion-
ate in their opposition, but often have difficulty articulating why.  Ask
them what’s wrong with thinking of fair use as a right for readers, listeners
and viewers, and they may point you to the work of Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, a nineteenth and early twentieth century American legal scholar
who developed an influential taxonomy of rights and privileges.101
Hohfeld suggested that the term “right” should be used only to describe
claims that others had a duty to honor.  If one were merely free to do as
one pleased without interference, that interest should be called a privilege
or liberty.102  Supporters of strong copyright have argued that, since copy-
right holders have no duty to facilitate readers’, listeners’ or viewers’ uses
of their works, members of the public have no “rights” under copyright
law.103  I’m not ready to concede that copyright owners never have a duty
to facilitate use of their works.  I’m also not persuaded that Hohfeld is
entitled to the last word:  the copyright statute itself refers to “the right of
fair use,”104 and courts frequently describe fair use as a “right.”105  None-
theless, in the spirit of baby steps, I’m happy to stop using the word
“rights” to describe readers’ interests in access to works and the freedom
to enjoy them.  Since the interests I’m referring to are liberty interests
100 See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 20, at 33-39; Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 679-
81.
101 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 19; Padden, supra note 23.
102 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
103 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 19.
104 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2006).  I’m grateful to Lolly Gasaway for bringing this to
my attention.
105 See, e.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, 601 F.3d 1224, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (“First
Amendment right to fair use of copyrighted material”); Bowers v. Baystate
Tech., 320 F.3d 1317, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“right to fair use”); Cable News
Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“rights of fair use”); Warren Publ’g v. Spurlock, 95 USPQ 2d 1685 (E.D. Pa
2010) (“fair use rights”); Blackwell Publ’g v. Excel, 661 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790
(E.D. Mich. 2009) (“fair use rights”); United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“users’ rights of fair use”).
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rather than property interests, I will refer to them as “copyright
liberties.”106
Some commentators view the interest in what I am terming “copy-
right liberties” as a newfangled product of post-modern literary criticism
and consumers’ giddy intoxication with new digital toys.107  They urge cau-
tion in undermining longstanding copyright law norms in response to what
may be a flash in the pan.  As the discussion in part II detailed, however,
solicitude for readers’ interests is as old as copyright itself.
Paradoxically, another assault on the idea of copyright liberties claims
that concern for readers is an artifact of outmoded quid-pro-quo thinking
that characterized nineteenth century copyright cases.  Congress (and the
courts) may have at one time believed that it was necessary to protect the
public interest from encroachment by copyright owners, but the United
States grew out of such childish fancies, and repudiated our old ideas when
we joined the Berne Convention in 1988 and revised our law to fit Berne’s
requirements.108  Congress’s choice to buttress copyright owner rights
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, they suggest, epitomize this evolved under-
standing.  Strong copyright protection, they say, is an engine of innovation
and economic prosperity;109 Congress has therefore wisely decided to
leave choices of dissemination and enforcement in copyright owners’
hands.
Congress is a multi-headed Hydra, which makes curious choices for
complex reasons, but there’s no basis to infer that recent enactments
demonstrate Congress’s new, modern copyright attitude, in which individ-
ual readers’, listeners’, and viewers’ copyright interests would no longer
require explicit protection.  Congress continues to take the rights of indi-
vidual readers, listeners and viewers very seriously.  Four years after ac-
ceding to the Berne Convention, Congress passed the Audio Home
Recording Act,110 which enacted an exemption that Congress believed
106 I have used this locution before. See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 597 (2008); Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra
note 66, at 38; Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 55, at 1879.
107 See Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 6-9; Justin R
Hughes, Recoding Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 924-28 (199); Merges, supra note 58, at 101-04. R
108 See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Symposium: Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Prop-
erty, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: Participation in the Interna-
tional Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 326-31 (2002).
109 See Global Intellectual Property Center, IP Myths v. Facts, http://www.the
globalipcenter.com/pages/ip-myths-v-facts (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
110 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006).
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would privilege “all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and
analog musical recordings.”111  In the run-up to the enactment of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act, members of Congress sought and received
repeated assurances that the bill’s provisions would not burden individu-
als’ private reading activities, or their use of libraries, and would not re-
duce the availability of fair use.112   In 2005, Congress added a new
copyright exemption to ensure that families could use technology to cen-
sor the playback of commercial DVDs,113 despite testimony from the Cop-
yright Office that the amendment was both unnecessary and
inadvisable.114  Thus, any assertion that Congress no longer cares about
individual copyright liberties strikes me as wishful thinking.
Other opponents of readers’ or users’ rights express concern that rec-
ognizing rights for users would unfairly limit rights for authors.  As Jane
Ginsburg writes, “the perspective of user rights, albeit important, should
remain secondary.  Without authors, there are no works to use.”115  These
commentators appear concerned that there is simply not enough copyright
pie to go around.116  Authors and owners are more deserving eaters than
users, who don’t add much value.117  Besides, users are so numerous that
if one were to feed each of them even a little pie, there wouldn’t be any
left.
I can appreciate the fears driving that sort of objection, although I
don’t see much basis for them in the real world.  According to reports
issued by the major commercial copyright industries, commerce in copy-
righted works continues apace, generating more jobs, bigger profits and a
111 H.R. REP. NO. 102-873 24 (1992); see also S. REP. NO. 102-294 30 (1991) (“The
purpose of S. 1623 is to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or
digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommer-
cial use.”).
112 See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 76, 80, 102-04 (1998).
113 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218,
codified at 17 U.S.C. 110(11) (2006).
114 See Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm., 108th
Cong. 6-14 (2004).
115 Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”, supra note 10 at
1468.  In a more recent article, Professor Ginsburg canvasses what she sees
as the plausible arguments supporting user rights, and finds them unpersua-
sive.  Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 3-5. R
116 See I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217, 226-28. See also Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, 97
MICH. L. REV. 462, 504-11 (1998) (criticizing Hardy’s application of the pie
metaphor).
117 See Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 3-4; Merges, R
supra note 59, at 111-14.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\58-2\CPY208.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-JUN-11 10:08
348 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
more impressive trade surplus every year.118 Moreover, the idea that read-
ers, listeners and users don’t add significant value to copyrighted works is
difficult to support.  Our habit of treating copyright as an entitlement of a
priestly class of authors and owners managed by an even more select
group of copyright-knowing lawyers has taught us to disregard the consid-
erable contributions to the copyright ecosystem made by readers, listeners
and viewers, but that doesn’t make their contributions less real.119
Finally, some opponents of explicit copyright protections for readers
acknowledge the usefulness of significant reader freedom, but argue that it
makes sense nonetheless to locate the power to grant or deny that free-
dom in copyright owners’ hands.120  If the freedom is important, copyright
owners will choose to offer it; if it later becomes inconvenient, they will
have the power to take it away.   This argument, though, undervalues the
importance of copyright liberties for the system.  Copyright owners may
not always be wise in the uses they choose to permit or prohibit; their
immediate goals may or may not align with society’s overarching goals for
having a copyright system in the first place.  Readers deserve guarantees
that their liberties will not be subject to copyright owner whims.
VI.
So far, I have argued that readers, listeners and viewers have always
been crucial beneficiaries of the copyright scheme. I have claimed that the
copyright law has, through its history, included provisions designed to as-
sure that audiences for copyrighted works have both opportunities to read,
hear and see them and the liberty to enjoy them as they choose to.  With-
out those provisions, copyright law might have frustrated its own core
objectives.  I have, finally, suggested that the arguments raised in opposi-
tion to readers’, listeners’, and viewers’ copyright liberties don’t make
much sense, even on their own terms.  From there, it is only one small
baby step to assert that when we assess how well the copyright system is
working, we need to pay attention to whether the opportunities and liber-
118 See, e.g., Stephen E. Siwek, Engines of Growth: Economic Contributions of
the U.S. Intellectual Property Industries (2005) (prepared for NBC-Univer-
sal), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060411213849/http://www.
nbcuni.com/About_NBC_Universal/Intellectual_Property/pdf/Engines_of_
Growth.pdf; Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy:
The 2003–2007 Report (2009) (prepared for the International Intellectual
Property Alliance), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport
2003-07.pdf.
119 See, e.g., Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 22, at 176-77; Rebecca Tushnet, R
Hybrid Vigor: Mashups, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary Monsters, 6 I/S: J. L.
& POLICY 1, 3-12 (2010).
120 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 17-20; R
Merges, supra note 59, at 114-15.
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ties secured to readers, listeners and viewers still suffice, or whether they
might need to be augmented or expanded. Many of you, especially those
of you who mistrusted my project from the outset, of course, suspected
that I would get here eventually.  It’s just one more baby step to conclude
that we should confirm, enhance, and modestly expand copyright liberties.
At least one purpose of copyright is to encourage reading, listening,
and viewing.  Readers, listeners and viewers have, and should have, liber-
ties under the copyright statute.  Whether we are interpreting the current
copyright law, or evaluating how well it works with a view toward improv-
ing it, we need to focus on readers as well as authors and owners.  In think-
ing about the appropriate scope of an exclusive copyright right, thus, we
need to pay attention not only to the incentives it supplies to authors, and
the prospects for commercial exploitation that it secures for owners, but
also to the opportunities it gives to readers, listeners and viewers to enjoy
copyrighted works creatively and in the ways they choose to. Those oppor-
tunities should include sufficient freedom to read, hear, see, experience,
and share works of authorship in ways other than the ways that copyright
owners might prefer.
Most copyright owners are not currently insisting on exercising close
control over their users’ experiences.121 They apparently appreciate that
freedom to enjoy the works they produce is valuable for their custom-
ers.122  At the same time, though, copyright owners are loathe to concede
that customers might be entitled to enjoy copyrighted works in unlicensed
ways; rather, they are hoarding what they insist are their rights under the
copyright law for a rainy day.123 That fact gives us an opportunity to re-
claim copyright liberties for readers, listeners and viewers without signifi-
cantly undermining any real world business models that copyright owners
have yet come to depend on.  We thus have a window, possibly only a
121 But see Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anti-Circumvention’s Interoper-
ability Policy, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549, 1569-74, 1585-89 (2009)
(describing litigation by owners of the copyrights in video and computer
games for violations of the anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201).
122 See Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22, at 19-20. R
123 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,  DMCA § 104 REPORT 50-66 (2001) (sum-
marizing comments on proposals for clarifying or expanding privileges to
make temporary or archival copies); United States Copyright Office Ex-
emption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, Docket # RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Com-
ments of Association of American Publishers et. al., 21-23 & n.46, 31-33
(Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11
metalitz_AAP.pdf; Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
67-70 (2004) (testimony of Jack Valenti for the Motion Picture Association
of America, that Family Movie Act would undermine the “fundamental
right” to make derivative works).
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small one, when we can restore readers’ liberties cheaply.  That makes it
important to think very seriously about the contours that copyright liber-
ties should have.
If we want to encourage opportunities to read, hear, see and enjoy
works individually and creatively, we need to maintain a zone of freedom
insulated from copyright owner control.  That zone need not be boundless,
but it needs to be large enough to be meaningful.
In exploring the appropriate scope of copyright liberties, I want to
resist the tendency in some of the literature to divide and conquer readers,
listeners and viewers by insisting that the interests of creative remixers are
distinct from those of passive consumers, and that one or the other of
those groups has superior claims to copyright’s solicitude.124 I want to in-
sist, instead, that copyright’s purpose is (and should be) to encourage
reading, listening, and viewing of both varieties.  As digital tools enable
audience members to interact with works of authorship in different and
interesting ways, any sharp distinction between passive consumption and
creative remixing dissolves into a spectrum of different ways of enjoying
works.125  When we think about the sorts of freedom that copyright law
should secure to audience interests, we need to pay attention to leaving
room for both the experience and the expression of individual reader, lis-
tener and viewer creativity.
We should, for example, ensure individuals’ liberty to choose how to
read, see, and hear works to which they’ve gained lawful access.  We do
that now by protecting their liberty to perform and display copyrighted
works privately, whether or not the copyright owner could make money
from licensing the performance or display.126   I’d argue that we should go
further.   If copyright is intended, in part, to protect audience interests in
enjoying works of authorship, then I think we need to define the scope of
124 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, supra note 22 at 5 (arguing R
that consumptive users have weaker claims to privilege than creative
reusers); Hughes, supra note 71 (arguing that passive listeners’ interests in
the stability of texts should outweigh the interests of creative recoders).
125 See Rebecca Tushnet. Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Crea-
tivity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You
There: User-Generated Content and Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 889 (2010).
126 The Second Circuit seems to have appreciated this in its ruling in Cartoon
Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2009), where it held that
cable subscriber’s use of a digital video recording system that caused a copy
to be recorded remotely on servers operated by the cable system and played
back via cable transmission from those servers resulted in  copies made and
privately performed by individual subscribers rather than made and publicly
performed by the cable system.
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copyright liberties to enjoy copyright works with some attention to what
range of audience behavior copyright should encourage.
Some expansion in reader, listener and viewer behavior that is for-
mally recognized as non-infringing will be relatively uncontroversial:  most
people, for example, support a freedom to engage in format shifting —
copying a copy to a new format to facilitate reading, listening or watching
if one is already entitled to read, listen or look at a copy in some other
format.127  Yes, a copyright owner could sell each format separately for
additional money, and yes, copyright owners often argue that the law enti-
tles them to do just that.  Yet, mostly, they don’t, because they recognize
that public resistence to the idea is fierce.  Thus, the lawyer for the record
labels in the MGM v. Grokster case told his clients that if they wanted to
win the case, they had to authorize him to tell the Supreme Court that it is
not copyright infringement to rip a CD you own and copy the resulting file
to an iPod.128
Archival or back-up copying is another sort of reproduction that
seems uncontroversially permissible.   Companies have launched busi-
nesses allowing their customers to make backup copies in the cloud,129
notwithstanding the fact that much of what is being backed up comes
within no express statutory privilege. Those companies are not afraid of
lawsuits, because they perceive the general social consensus that making a
spare copy of works — especially those in delicate formats — should not
be copyright infringement.  Copyright owner groups resist that under-
standing because they’ve imbued the word “copy” with talismanic signifi-
cance.  People shouldn’t be able to make backup copies of anything
because copyright right means the exclusive right to control the making of
any and all copies.  But that’s silly.  Even sillier is the insistence that that
principle extends to ephemeral copies in the random access memory of a
127 See, e.g., Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: E-Book Dodge, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr.
4, 2010, at 15  (“Buying a book or a piece of music should be regarded as a
license to enjoy it on any platform”); Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copy-
right, supra note 22, at 12 (“There is an additional rationale for private cop- R
ying, partially implicit in the Sony justification of fair use time-shifting.
Where one has lawful access to the work, there may be an implied right to
enjoy the work in a manner convenient to the consumer.”); cf. Liu, Owning
Digital Copies, supra note 65, at 1340-52 (proposing “unlimited right to ac-
cess digital copies in one’s possession”).
128 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), No. 04-
480, Oral Argument at 12 (Mar. 29, 2005).
129 See, e.g., Apple, MobileMe – Access and Share Files from Anywhere, http://
www.apple.com/mobileme/features/idisk.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011);
Barracuda Backup Service – Integrated Local and Offsite Backup, http://
www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/products/backup_overview.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2011); Zmanda Cloud Backup, http://www.zmanda.com/cloud-
backup.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
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computer or digital device.  The idea that if you buy a Kindle book rather
than a hardcopy book, the publisher should be able to give or withhold
permission for every glance because each screenful of text is a new and
potentially actionable copy is simply insupportable.130  No law designed to
encourage reading should do that.
Revising a work for one’s own personal use is another freedom, akin
to format shifting, that ought not to be deemed to encroach on the copy-
right owner’s right to prepare derivative works.  In this category, I would
place the use of censorware to avoid seeing the sexually explicit or violent
parts of movies on DVDs that the viewer rents or owns; or the modifica-
tion of a videogame to speed it up or slow it down; or the adaptation of a
computer program to make it do a better job of doing what one bought it
to do. The statute and current court decisions already allow those activities
in some narrow circumstances,131 so it isn’t much of a leap to decide they
ought to be deemed to be okay as a general matter.
So far, I’ve been talking about uses that are primarily personal or
private.  But, I think readers’ liberties need to extend to uses that are pub-
lic.  Sharing is important.  Here, though, we need to pay attention to the
fact that allowing people to make free copies and share them with other
people threatens what lawyers call the “investment-backed expectations”
of distributors.  That doesn’t mean that sharing is or should be illegal in
every case, but it does mean that we need to exercise some care in defining
the scope of permissible sharing.   But it is untenable to argue that no
sharing is or should be permitted without the copyright owner’s permis-
sion, and nobody who makes that argument expects people to swallow it
whole.
Everyone agrees that fair use should secure the freedom to criticize,
comment on, talk about or respond to works of authorship, but people
disagree, violently, about how broad that freedom should be.  It’s impor-
tant that any test we use to divide the permissible comment from the in-
fringing comment take into account the value of encouraging readers,
listeners and viewers to respond to works as well as the value, if any, of
allowing copyright owners to control downstream conversations about the
works they own.
We are on the verge of reaching a social consensus that mashing-up is
an important copyright liberty that copyright owners should not want to
prevent, so long as the mashups are noncommercial.  For much the same
reasons, the law should regard sharing mashups non-commercially as
within the sphere of permissible enjoyment. We have always encouraged
130 See Liu, Owning Digital Copies, supra note 65, at 1337-65.
131 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(11), 117(a) (2006); Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of
Am., 964 F.2d 965 (1992).
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readers, listeners and viewers to talk with each other about works of au-
thorship.  Today, that conversation is as often as not over digital networks
and as often as not includes extracts from the works.  If we pay attention
to copyright’s goal of encouraging enjoyment of copyrighted works, then
permitting those conversations seems like an easy policy call.132
Most importantly, I’d argue that we need to reform the discourse.
Talking about readers’ rights shouldn’t be the province only of teenagers,
communists and librarians.  We need, I think, to reclaim the notion that
one of the core goals of a healthy copyright system is to encourage read-
ing, listening and viewing.
VII
This last section is more speculative.  Like many copyright scholars,
I’ve been struck by the deterioration in popular support for copyright law
over the past twenty years.133  I also find it notable that, when I try to find
some scholarly defenders of ever-stronger copyright to disagree with,
there seem to be fewer and fewer of them around.  At least one copyright
lawyer has complained of “a host of legal academic ideologues who
viewed the current state of protection as a constitutional abomination.”134
That lawyer blames legal scholars and “well-funded business entities” that
are egging them on for the problem.135 There are, of course, other pos-
sibilities. Here’s one:  It may be that the fading appreciation of readers’
interests has itself undermined copyright’s legitimacy.  When readers and
other members of the audience are pushed out of the picture frame, copy-
right no longer seems to have a persuasive mechanism by which it can
“promote the Progress of Science.”  It’s hard to convince the public that
copyright merits their buy-in unless it apparently and actually protects au-
dience interests as well as the rights of authors and owners. Thus, re-
claiming copyright law for readers, listeners, and viewers may offer a
particularly promising opportunity for rebuilding public faith in the copy-
right system and interesting a new generation of academics in the work of
its defense.
132 See Tushnet, I Put You There, supra note 125.
133 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 63–67 (2002); Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters
the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 701 (2005).
134 Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege:  Reflections of an In House
Counsel, 53 J. COPYIGHT SOC’Y 387, 392 (2006).
135 Id. at 394-99.
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